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AIR CABOTAGE: HISTORICAL AND
MODERN-DAY PERSPECTIVES
DOUGLAS R. LEWIS
H ISTORICALLY, nations have protected their domestic trade
and commerce from outside competition through the concept
of cabotage. The origin of the term is in dispute,1 but cabotage is
generally understood as the carriage of passengers, cargo and mail
between two points within the territory of the same nation for
compensation or hire.' Such traffic has traditionally been reserved
for the state's own carriers. Since the advent of modem aviation,
the United States, under domestic and international law, has re-
served air cabotage to its domestic carriers, affording them broad
protection from foreign carrier competition. In February of 1980,
however, the International Air Transportation Competition Act
of 1979' was passed, section 13 of which creates a narrow excep-
tion to United States cabotage law. This comment examines the
provision of that statute dealing with cabotage against the his-
torical background which excluded foreign carriers from purely
domestic transportation.
CABOTAGE-A HISTORICAL INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In maritime law cabotage originally was limited to coastal
trade between ports on the same coast of a state. The state's right
'The term "cabotage" may derive from "cabot" or "chabot," French terms
for a small vessel. Cooper, Aviation Cabotage and Territory, 1952 U.S. Av. REP.
256, 257 [hereinafter cited as Cooper]. Alternatively, it may be derived from the
Spanish word "cabo," meaning "cape," which was used to describe navigation
proceeding from cape to cape along the coast without going into the open
seas. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (4th rev. ed. 1968). Cabotage exists both
in aviation and maritime law. Air cabotage refers to cabotage transported by
air. Surface cabotage refers to cabotage transported by water.
I Sheehan, Air Cabotage and the Chicago Convention, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1157,
1157 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Sheehan].
3Id.
'Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as International Competition Act].
'Sheehan, supra note 2, at 1157; Thomas & Thomas, Theories of Trade in
International Law and their Influence on Air Commerce, 7 Sw. L.J. 219, 237
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
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to reserve such trade to its own vessels was based on its jurisdiction
over territorial waters." Eventually the concept was broadened to
include trade between ports of the same state located on different
coasts, for example, trade between Boston and San Francisco, even
though it was necessary to traverse the high seas to reach the desti-
nation port.7 Some countries, notably the United States and Portu-
gal, expanded surface cabotage to include trade between the home
state and its overseas possessions. This expansion has never been
widely accepted, however, under international maritime law, due to
fear of economic reprisals.!
It was not until the Convention Relating to the Regulation of
Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention of 1919) that a specific air
cabotage provision received international support! Article 16 of
the Convention provided in relevant part, "[e]ach contracting State
shall have the right to establish reservations and restrictions in
favour of its national aircraft in connection with the carriage of
persons and goods for hire between two points on its territory. '
The primary issue raised by this language was the meaning of
"territory." Under article 1 of the Convention the contracting
states recognized that "every power has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." The article de-
fined "territory of a State" as including the home state, colonial
territories and adjacent waters. Article 40 provided, in addition,
that protectorates and mandates administered under the League
of Nations should be assimilated into the territories of the pro-
tecting or mandatory state for purposes of the Convention. "Terri-
tory" as thus defined in articles 1 and 40 included land areas and
their adjacent waters under the sovereignty, protection or man-
date of a state." This definition was applied to article 16 so that
6 Sheehan, supra note 2, at 1157; Thomas, supra note 5, at 237.
7 Sheehan, supra note 2, at 1157-58; Thomas, supra note 5, at 237. Coastal
trade between two points of a single territory along the same coast is called
"petit-cabotage." Trade between ports of a single territory on two different seas
is termed "grand-cabotage." B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INThRNATMONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 314 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CHENG].6 Thomas, supra note 5, at 237.
Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, signed, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
'
0 Id. at art. 16.
11 Id. at arts. 1, 40; Cooper, supra note 1, at 266.
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trade between all land areas and territorial waters under a state's
political jurisdiction was encompassed within the cabotage re-
striction and therefore reserved to that state's national carriers."
The present Convention on International Civil Aviation (the
Chicago Convention of 1944)" abrogated the Paris Convention
of 1919. The purpose of the Chicago Convention was to estab-
lish a workable and efficient international aviation system through
the establishment of multilateral agreements for the exchange of
commercial air rights. ' The United States initiated the conference
and invited discussion on various matters including "the applica-
tion of cabotage to air traffic." The term "cabotage" as used by
the United States did not, however, follow the narrow construc-
tion applied in maritime law, namely coastal trade between points
in the same national geographic unit. Rather, the United States'
construction of cabotage included traffic between a territory and
its colonies and possessions." Despite its apparent broadness, the
12 Cooper, supra note 1, at 266-67. Although the United States did not sign
the final document, a draft submitted by the United States proved influential in
the making of the final draft of the Paris Convention and provided in relevant
part:
Article 1-The contracting states recognize the full and absolute
sovereignty and jurisdiction of every state in the air space above
its territory and territorial waters.
Article 3-Each contracting state shall have the right to impose
special restrictions by way of reservations or otherwise with respect
to the public conveyance of persons and goods between two points
on its territory.
Id. at 265.
13 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec.
7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 [hereinafter cited as Chicago Con-
vention].
14 Institut du Transport Aerien, Cabotage in International Air Transport,
Historical and Present Day Aspects, 7-E, 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ITA
Study].
11The United States submitted two similar proposals regarding cabotage.
Document No. 16 contained the following "cabotage" article:
Article 21: Air commerce for hire may be reserved as cabotage
exclusively to the aircraft of any Contracting State only if it both
originates and terminates within the limits of such Contracting State
or is between such Contracting State and its colonies and possessions
or among such colonies and possessions.
Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 2820, at 561 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Conference
Proceedings]. Document No. 19, in part, stated:
UNITED STATES PROPOSAL OF AN AGREEMENT RE-
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United States' definition met with objection because it excluded
"commerce with mandated areas or protectorates as cabotage.""
The final draft of the Chicago Convention ultimately included




Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission
to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its
territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or
hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each
contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements
which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis
to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to




For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall
be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or man-
date of such State."
The first sentence of article 7 recognizes a nation's right under
the Convention to reserve for its national aircraft all carriage of
passengers, mail or cargo transported for compensation between
two points within areas under its sovereignty, suzerainty, protection
or mandate. A broad, fundamental principle of sovereignty with
specific application to cabotage is thereby established for air
transportation. 9
GARDING PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WORLD
ROUTES AND SERVICES
(6) Each state signatory hereto reserves the right to reserve as
cabotage exclusively to aircraft of its own nationality traffic which
both originates and terminates within the limits of such signatory
state; provided that for the purposes of this agreement the limits of




7 Chicago Convention, supra note 13, at art. 7.
181 d. at art. 2.
" Robinson, Changing Concepts of Cabotage: A Challenge to the Status of
United States Carriers in International Civil Aviation?, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 553,
561 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]; ITA Study, supra note 14, at 13.
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The broad definition of air cabotage in article 7 is attributable
partially to the circumstances surrounding the Chicago Conven-
tion. The wartime environment then existing allowed nationalistic
concerns to prevail over international goals.' It was argued that
air transportation must remain totally under domestic control to
insure adequate protection of national interests."' Indicative of the
general view of most states participating in the Convention is the
following explanation of the United States proposal on cabotage:
It is the view of the United States that each country should, as
far as possible, come to control and direct its own internal air
lines. In the long view, no country will wish to have its essential
internal air communications under the domination of any save
their own nationals.... [This] suggests recognition of the principle
that the people of each country must have the dominant voice in
their own transport systems. If air transport is not to become
an instrument of attempted domination, recognition of this prin-
ciple seems to be essential.'
The undeveloped state of the commercial aviation industry further
encouraged recognition of extensive cabotage rights as a protec-
tive device necessary to insulate carriers from competition and
thereby assure their continuing financial viability." Similarly, the
nature of air transportation added impetus to vast sovereignty
claims over domestic traffic. Unlike sea transportation, which is
restricted to coastal trade, air transportation is able to penetrate
the major internal centers of commerce and increase their vulner-
ability to international market forces."
The second sentence of article 7 employs a reciprocity principle
to restrict discriminatory grants of cabotage rights. The nature of
this restriction, whether qualified or absolute, has always been a
matter of controversy due to the ambiguity attaching to the words
"specifically" and "on an exclusive basis." Two interpretations of
this language have been postulated by legal scholars. The first,
referred to as the strict or restrictive version, de-emphasizes "speci-
fically" and gives effect to the phrase, "on an exclusive basis. '
"Sheehan, supra note 2, at 1160.
"Conference Proceedings, supra note 15, at 61.
2Id.
"Hesse, Some Questions on Aviation Cabotage, 1953 MCGILL L.J. 129, 133.
2ITA Study, supra note 14, at 7, 8.
-Id. at 9.
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This construction allows cabotage privileges to be granted only
on a nonexclusive basis, thereby creating an absolute prohibition
against discriminatory grants."' Accordingly, if one state is awarded
cabotage privileges by another state, any other contracting state
may demand corresponding privileges." Although this strict ap-
proach theoretically bans only exclusive grants of cabotage privi-
leges, in practice it also discourages nonexclusive grants between
two contracting states since any such grant would automatically
expose the grantor state to unlimited entry by other states de-
manding similar privileges, a notion which is repugnant to na-
tionalistic doctrines."8 Understandably, the restriction thus imposed
against cabotage agreements has been criticized as an undue in-
fringement upon the free exercise of national sovereignty."
-'This strict interpretation of the second sentence appears to accord with the
United States' position at the Convention. A United States draft proposal sub-
mitted as part of Document 19 stated:
(7) In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to assure
equality of treatment, it is provided that:
(a) Each state shall refrain from granting exclusive rights of
air commerce to any nation or its air transport enterprises, or from
making any agreement excluding or discriminating against the air-
craft of any signatory state, and will terminate any existing exclu-
sive or discriminatory rights as soon as such action can be taken
under presently outstanding agreements.
Conference Proceedings, supra note 15, at 1269. As 7(a) indicates, the United
States sought a prohibition on all exclusive agreements, not merely those which
were "specifically" made exclusive. That the United States delegation foresaw
undesirable possibilities resulting from discriminatory cabotage arrangements is
demonstrated by its statement:
[Tihe right of reserved cabotage can be exercised by one country
only; for if a number of countries were to pool their cabotage as
between each other, the results would be merely to exclude nations
not parties to the pool; and it is the firm conviction of this Gov-
ernment that discriminatory or exclusive agreements are raw ma-
terial for future conflict.
Id. at 61-62.
27Id. at 61-62; Robinson, supra note 19, at 561.
28 See ITA Study, supra note 14, at 15.
19 At the Sixteenth Session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), the delegate from Sweden argued that the second sentence
of article 7, construed restrictively, was contrary to the spirit of article 1 of
the Chicago Convention. ICAO Doe. 8771, A 16-EX (1968), at 44, 55 39:2,
39:4. Article 1 states: "The contracting States recognize that every State has
the complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."
Chicago Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1. One delegate stated that this
argument was invalid because the Convention's purpose was to impose limita-
tions upon sovereignty for the common good. ICAO Doe. 8771, A 16-EX (1968),
at 44, 55 39:2, 39:4.
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Unlike the strict version, the second interpretation, known as
the flexible or liberal version, gives full meaning to "specifically"
in article 7.' This construction allows cabotage rights to be granted
on an exclusive basis where it is not stipulated that they are ex-
clusive, without third states having the right to demand corres-
ponding privileges." The agreement must always leave open the
possibility that other states may receive similar cabotage privileges.
Hence, states may conclude agreements granting cabotage privi-
leges to other states so long as the agreements do not specify that
these rights are exclusive. A tacit agreement to the same effect
could then be adhered to by the contracting states.' If this logic is
employed, it is obvious that cabotage rights easily may be ex-
changed on a discriminatory basis.' So long as the agreement
does not contain an express provision precluding the grant of
cabotage privileges to another state, an excluded state will be
hard-pressed to prove that the exclusivity restriction in article 7 is
violated. As one writer has noted, "the burden placed upon a
complainant State, of proving that certain cabotage rights were
given on the basis of 'exclusivity,' would in most, if not all, in-
stances be insuperable.""
UNITED STATES STATUTES ON CABOTAGE
The first United States aviation regulatory statute was the Air
Commerce Act of 1926.3 Under that statute, the navigation of
foreign-registered aircraft in the United States was prohibited ex-
cept as authorized by section 6 of the Act. Section 6(c) permitted
the Secretary of Commerce to authorize, on a reciprocal basis,
foreign-registered aircraft "to be navigated in the United States."'"
It contained a prohibition, however, against foreign aircraft en-
ITA Study, supra note 14, at 9, 14.
' CHENG, supra note 7, at 315; ITA Study, supra note 14, at 9.
Hesse, Some Questions on Aviation Cabotage, 1953 McGILL L.J. 129, 140.
The Scandinavian states have adopted the flexible interpretation of article
7. In agreements granting reciprocal cabotage rights between them, they employ
an additional safeguard by including a safety clause which terminates the agree-
ment in the event third states demand cabotage rights by virtue of article 7. ITA
Study, supra note 14, at 14.
34 Robinson, supra note 19, at 562.
" Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
Id. § 6(c), 44 Stat. 572.
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gaging in cabotage operations in the following terms: "[N]o foreign
aircraft shall engage in interstate or intrastate air commerce.
37
This language was technically objectionable because the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926 failed to define "intrastate commerce. ' To
cure this defect, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938" altered sec-
tion 6(c) to read that "no foreign aircraft shall engage in air
commerce otherwise than between any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States, or the District of Columbia and a
foreign country." Legislative history indicates the 1938 revision
of the section 6 prohibition was not intended to work a substantive
change in the former version."' This language thus precludes for-
eign carriers from engaging in air commerce "otherwise than be-
tween" a point in the United States and a "foreign country," thereby
reserving cabotage traffic for domestic carriers.
In 1953, section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was again
amended2 to transfer the functions authorized under the statute
from the Secretary of Commerce to the Civil Aeronautics Board'
(the CAB or the Board). In addition, a language revision was
11 Id. It is generally agreed this provision was "designed to reserve to United
States registered aircraft the domestic commerce of the United States." S.
REP. No. 1718, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
a' The pertinent definitions were:
[A]s used in this Act, the term "air commerce" means transporta-
tion in whole or in part by aircraft of persons or property for
hire, navigation of aircraft in furtherance of a business ...
As used in this Act, the term "interstate or foreign air com-
merce" means air commerce between any State, Territory, or
possession, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside
thereof: or between points within the same State, Territory, or
possession, or the District of Columbia, but through the airspace
over any place outside thereof; or wholly within the airspace
over any Territory or possession or the District of Columbia.
44 Stat. at 568. The term "intrastate air commerce" was not defined except to
the extent it was encompassed in the definition of "air commerce." Id. See S.
RPP. No. 1718, supra note 37, at 5-6.
3 ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), now codified in Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938].
40 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, S 1107(i)(5), 52 Stat. 1028 (1938).
41 S. REP. No. 1718, supra note 37, at 5. In 1952 the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce indicated that the principal reason for re-
taining section 6(c) "was the anticabotage provision which prevented intrastate
or interstate air commerce by foreign aircraft." Id. at 4.
4
'Act of Aug. 8, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-225, 67 Stat. 489 (1953).
4See S. REP. No. 1718, supra note 37, at 4-5.
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made to accord more fully with the cabotage prohibition con-
tained in article 7 of the Chicago Convention. This revision was
necessary "to leave no doubt that the United States [would] take
full advantage of the reservation" there afforded.' The new lan-
guage vested the CAB with broad powers to permit foreign air-
craft to engage in commercial operations within the United States.'
Before exercising its authority, however, the Board was required
to make a dual finding that: (1) the nation in which the foreign
carrier was registered had granted reciprocal privileges to United
States carriers; and (2) the foreign carrier's activities would be
in the public interest." When these two standards were satisfied,
the Board could authorize a foreign carrier to navigate in the
United States, except the Board was denied any authority to grant
cabotage privileges to foreign carriers.'
In 1958, the current Federal Aviation Act" rescinded the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
Former section 6 was transferred to the Act with only minor re-
44 Id. at 6. In the "Statement of Purpose" for the proposed legislation, the
Senate committee indicated the amendment was directed specifically to the
Chicago Convention and the United States' intent to "live up to the letter and
spirit of its obligations under that convention." Id. at 11.
4' The new language stated, in pertinent part:
(b) Foreign aircraft . . . may be navigated in the United States
by airmen holding certificates or licenses issued or rendered valid
by the United States or by the nation in which the aircraft is
registered if such foreign nation grants a similar privilege with
respect to aircraft of the United States and only if such navigation
is authorized by permit, order, or regulation issued by the Civil
Aeronautics Board hereunder, and in accordance with the terms,
conditions, and limitations thereof. The Civil Aeronautics Board
shall issue permits, orders, or regulations . . . only as the Board
shall find such action to be in the interest of the public: Provided,
however, That in exercising its power hereunder, the Board shall do
so consistently with any treaty, convention or agreement which may
be in force between the United States and any foreign country or
countries. Foreign civil aircraft permitted to navigate in the United
States under this subsection may be authorized by the Board to
engage in air commerce within the United States except that they
shall not take on at any point within the United States, persons,
property, or mail carried for compensation or hire and destined for
another point within the United States.
67 Stat. at 489.
4Id.
4 7 1d. See S. REP. No. 1718, supra note 37, at 11-12.
48Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §S
1301-1542 (Supp. 1979).
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drafting."' The legislative background on the new section, rede-
signated as section 1108,' reveals it is a "reenactment, without
substantial change" of the former section 6." The Board's power
to authorize foreign carrier operations in the United States under
that section is therefore continued under section 1108(b), sub-
ject to the specific exception that the Board cannot authorize such
aircraft to "take on at any point within the United States persons,
property, or mail carried for compensation or hire and destined
for another point within the United States.""
In addition to section 1108 (b), section 402 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act is generally recognized as a further prohibition against
the transportation of cabotage traffic by foreign aircraft." Section
402(a) provides that "[n]o foreign air carrier shall engage in
foreign air transportation unless there is in force a permit" from
the Board authorizing such operations." Foreign carrier operations
must fall within the ambit of section 402 inasmuch as it constitutes
the sole authority under which foreign aircraft may conduct serv-
ices pursuant to a CAB permit." Under section 402 the Board
is empowered to issue permits to foreign carriers, after notice and
hearing, authorizing them to engage in foreign air transportation
upon findings that the carrier is fit, willing and able, and the
transportation will be in the public interest." "Foreign air trans-
portation" is defined in the Federal Aviation Act as the carriage
by aircraft of traffic "in commerce between . . . a place in the
United States and any place outside thereof."' Since cabotage is
traffic between two points within the United States," it is not
"foreign air transportation" within the meaning of section 402
4949 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 19,
reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3758.
"49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976).
"H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 49, at 19.
S249 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976).
-"49 U.S.C.A. § 1372 (1976 & Supp. 1979). See S. REP. No. 329, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1979).
549 U.S.C. S 1372(a) (1976).
"See generally Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49
U.S.C.A. § 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979).
"49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1976).
5749 U.S.C.A. § 1301(24)(c) (Supp. 1979).
6849 U.S.C. § 1508(b) (1976).
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which can be authorized to a foreign carrier. 9
The preceding analysis is consistent with the CAB's interpreta-
tion of section 402 as expressed in a 1959 interpretative ruling
on the cabotage clause of section 1108(b).'° The issue addressed
by the Board was whether foreign aircraft, operating through the
United States under foreign carrier permits, could provide trans-
portation only for the United States segment of an international
journey. Finding that "section 1108 (b) is technically applicable to
the foreign civil aircraft utilized by a foreign carrier conducting
operations pursuant to a section 402 permit," 1 the CAB ruled that
such operations, referred to as "foreign transfer traffic," constituted
cabotage traffic not permitted to foreign carriers." In a general
statement of United States policy regarding cabotage, the CAB
remarked:
[C]ommercial transportation wholly between U.S. points of...
foreign transfer traffic is an internal activity, and its carriage is a
normal incident of domestic operations. Moreover, whether by rea-
son of [section 1108(b)] or otherwise, the generally prevailing
view.., appears to have been that transportation may be provided
between two U.S. points by a foreign air carrier only where the
same air carrier providing a domestic portion of the transportation
also provides transportation to or from an unauthorized foreign
point, . . .or in circumstances where the carrier is merely trans-
porting across the United States traffic picked up by it at a foreign
point and to be discharged by it at yet another foreign point. In
other words, under U.S. authorizations permitting commercial
access to this Nation, a foreign carrier may incidentally transport
within this country only that traffic which it brings in or carries
out."
The foregoing language indicates that foreign carriers operating
under foreign carrier permits are restricted to foreign air trans-
portation, although the statutory basis, whether section 1108(b)
or section 402, is not made clear. In its holding the Board indi-
cates that sections 402 and 1108 are both violated where foreign
carriers carry cabotage traffic, finding:
1 49 U.S.C.A. § 1372 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 29 C.A.B. 33 (1959).
6I Id. at 37.
2id.
63 Id. at 36.
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1. That the restriction contained in section 1108 of the [Federal
Aviation Act] that no foreign civil aircraft "shall take on at any
point in the United States, persons, property, or mail carried for
compensation or hire and destined for another point in the United
States" has application to foreign civil aircraft utilized in opera-
tions conducted under authority of a foreign air carrier permit
issued under [section 402 of the Act].
3. That the term "foreign air transportation" as it appears in
foreign carrier permits does not permit the initial taking on by a
foreign air carrier at one U.S. point of traffic carried for compen-
sation or hire and destined to another U.S. point for final dis-
charge by that carrier."
The foregoing reveals that the United States consistently has
reserved cabotage traffic for domestic carriers, thus protecting
domestic airlines, workers and markets from the rigors of foreign
competition. Whether current United States law continues that
policy must be determined from the 1979 congressional act.
THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION
ACT OF 1979
The International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979'
(hereinafter referred to as the International Competition Act)
became law on February 15, 1980. The International Competition
Act amends the Federal Aviation Act in an effort to encourage
competition in international air transportation, afford greater
opportunities for domestic air carriers and establish goals for de-
veloping United States international aviation negotiating policy."6
Of central importance here is section 13 which permits the Board,
in emergency circumstances, to exempt foreign air carriers from
the restrictions of the Federal Aviation Act to the extent necessary
to authorize such carriers to transport cabotage traffic. " Section
13, in substance, provides that an exemption may be granted only
to the extent that it is in the public interest, for a period not ex-
Id. at 47.
International Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
66 H. CONF. REP. No. 716, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).




ceeding thirty days, if the Board, after consultation with the Secre-
tary of Transportation, finds that: (a) traffic in affected markets
cannot be accommodated by United States carriers because of an
emergency created by unusual circumstances not arising in the
normal course of business;"8 (b) all possible efforts have been made
to accommodate the traffic on United States carriers;" and (c)
the exemption is necessary to avoid undue hardship to such traffic."
An additional finding is required where the inability to accommo-
date traffic in a market results from a labor dispute, in which case,
granting the exemption must not result in an undue advantage to
any party to such dispute.' When these criteria are satisfied and
the Board exercises its exemption authority, section 13 further
provides that the Board must: assure that the foreign carrier pro-
vides air transportation upon fair and reasonable terms; continu-
ously monitor the passenger load factor of United States aircraft
serving the market; and review the conditions in the affected
market at least once every thirty days to determine if the emergency
still exists." Thirty-day renewals may be issued by the Board, pro-
vided that authorization to foreign carriers under section 13 shall
be ineffective within five days after the emergency conditions have
ceased."'
The International Competition Act and the Chicago Convention
An examination of section 13 raises, the issue of whether it can be
enforced consistently with article 7 of the Chicago Convention.' As
has been discussed, article 7 is subject to two interpretations. The
"rigid" interpretation requires that cabotage rights be granted on a
nonexclusive basis only.' If one state is granted cabotage privileges,
any other state which participated in the Chicago Convention may








74 The Federal Aviation Act requires the Board to perform its duties in ac-
cordance with any treaties, conventions, or agreements which may be in force
between the United States and any foreign country. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
., See notes 25-27 supra, and accompanying text.
76 ITA Study, supra note 14, at 9; Robinson, supra note 19, at 561.
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pretation, if the Board finds that an exemption may properly be
granted pursuant to section 13, the Board theoretically must grant
every requesting state the right to transport cabotage during the
exemption period. This result is totally impractical since it con-
travenes the national sovereignty which the United States exer-
cises over its territory."' Conversely, the second and more liberal
interpretation allows cabotage rights to be granted on a discrimi-
natory basis." One state may award another state or its carriers
exclusive cabotage rights provided that those rights are not specified
as exclusive. This interpretation has been accepted by the Depart-
ment of State which explained its interpretation of article 7 to the
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation as follows:
Article 7 of the Chicago Convention contains a commitment that
a state will not "enter into any arrangements [which] specifically
grant any-cabotage-privilege on an exclusive basis to any other
state." Some have claimed that this provision would require a
state granting any cabotage rights to open automatically its doors
to all other foreign airlines interested in cabotage. We strongly
disagree with that interpretation. In our view, the clear meaning
of this provision ... is that two states may not conclude explicit
agreements that particular cabotage grants are to be exclusive.
But the provision does not intrude on the rights of a state that
makes a cabotage grant to exercise its sovereign, unilateral judg-
ment whether, and under what circumstances it will make addi-
tional grants."
Hence, under this liberal interpretation, the CAB may issue an
exemption order under section 13 stating simply that a foreign
airline may transport cabotage during an emergency. So long as
the order does not state "specifically" that the airline has exclu-
sive rights, article 7 would not be violated.'" That the privilege is
not granted specifically in such a case is, of course, a fiction. Even
though the language does not expressly state that the grant is
exclusive, it would in fact be exclusive since other airlines would
still be under the proscriptions of section 1108(b) and 402 of
"See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
7" See notes 30-33 supra, and accompanying text.
"I nternational Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979: Hearings on
S. 1300 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1300].
"See notes 30-34 supra, and accompanying text.
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the Federal Aviation Act." Nonetheless, without a written text
granting exclusive cabotage rights, article 7 is not violated since
other states theoretically may receive similar privileges."
The International Competition Act-An Analysis
In granting an exemption from the cabotage prohibitions of
the Federal Aviation Act, section 13 is designed to prevent hard-
ship to the public in emergency situations in which domestic car-
riers are unable to accommodate the traffic." To the extent which
it accomplishes this purpose, section 13 properly recognizes the
valid public interest in an efficient and dependable air transport
system. When severe disruptions of domestic air transportation
occur, thousands of passengers may be stranded or have their
vacation or business plans disrupted." Similarly, perishable goods
may remain unshipped and business may be seriously hampered
due to the lack of air freight capacity.' Section 13, however,
largely fails to protect the legitimate public interest involved. In
an effort to assure maximum protection of labor and airline inter-
ests, Congress accorded those interests predominant consideration
over the public's interests.
Section 13 states that the Board may grant the exemption only
to the extent that it is in the public interest.' The Federal Aviation
Act provides that in exercising its duties, the Board must consider
the following policies, among others, as being in the public interest
and in accordance with public convenience and necessity:
1. The maintenance of safety in air commerce."
2. The availability of sufficient, low-price services by domestic
and foreign carriers without unjust discriminations, undue prefer-
ences or advantages, or unfair or deceptive practices."
81 See notes 52-59 supra, and accompanying text.
See ITA Study, supra note 14, at 14.
93S. REP. No. 329, supra note 53, at 9-10.
84 Id.
95Id. at 10.
" International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
87 "(1) The assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest priority in air
commerce ..... " Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, S
3(a), 92 Stat. 1706 (1978) (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(1) (Supp. 1979)).
" "(3) The availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and low-
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3. Maximum reliance on competition to provide necessary air
transportation service and to insure the continued financial via-
bility of domestic carriers."
4. The availability of a sound regulatory environment which is
responsive to the public's needs and which allows prompt decision-
making in order to promote adaption of the air transportation sys-
tem to the present and future needs of the domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the na-
tional defense.'
5. The elimination of unfair and anti-competitive practices in
air transportation. 1
6. The promotion of civil aeronautics and a viable, privately-
owned domestic aviation industry. 2
7. Strengthening of the competitive position of domestic car-
riers to at least guarantee equality with foreign air carriers.'
price services by air carriers and foreign air carriers without unjust discrimi-
nations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or deceptive practices, the
need to improve relations among, and coordinate transportation by, air car-
riers. . . " 92 Stat. at 1706 (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a)(3) (Supp
1979)).
"1"(4) The placement of maximum reliance on competitive market forces
and on actual and potential competition (A) to provide the needed air trans-
portation system, and (B) to encourage efficient and well-managed carriers to
earn adequate profits and to attract capital. 92 Stat. at 1706 (codified in
49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (4) (Supp. 1979)).
'3 (5) The development and maintenance of a sound regulatory
environment which is responsive to the needs of the public and in
which decisions are reached promptly in order to facilitate adaption
of the air transportation system to the present and future needs of
the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States, the Postal
Service, and the national defense.
92 Stat. at 1706 (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(5) (Supp. 1979)).
91 (7) The prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompeti-
tive practices in air transportation, and the avoidance of
(A) unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market
domination, and monopoly power; and
(B) other conditions;
that would tend to allow one or more air carriers or foreign air
carriers unreasonably to increase prices, reduce services, or ex-
clude competition in air transporation.
92 Stat. at 1706 (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a)(5) (Supp. 1979)).
92 "(11) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics
and a viable, privately owned United States air transport industry." International
Competition Act, S 2, 94 Stat. 35-36 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1302(a)(11)).
93"(12) The strengthening of the competitive position of United States air
carriers to at least assure equality with foreign air carriers, including the attain-
ment of opportunities for United States air carriers to maintain and increase their




These guidelines require the Board to consider the interests of
the United States public generally as well as those of domestic
air carriers, foreign carriers, private shippers and consignees."4
As such, the public interest standard does not accord undue con-
sideration to the interests of any one group. However, the achieve-
ment of one of these goals, such as a sound regulatory environ-
ment responsive to the public's needs, may conflict directly with
another goal, such as the strengthening of the competitive posi-
tion of United States carriers."'
Before granting an exemption, section 13 requires the Board
to consult with the Secretary of Transportation who must make
findings concerning the existence of an emergency, the exhaustion
of domestic carrier resources, and an exemption's potential effect
upon related labor disputes and the general public." The Secretary
of Transportation, however, advocates an extremely limited use of
section 13." Therefore, by subjecting the decision-making process
to his scrutiny, this provision implements a potentially significant
check upon the Board's exemption authority. This requirement is
subject to criticism. Under the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary
of Transportation has primary responsibility for the promotion of
safety in air commerce... The findings which the Secretary and
the CAB must make before granting an exemption do not directly
involve safety concerns and hence are not within the special pur-
view of the Secretary's power. The CAB has noted that a co-
ordinated effort between it and the Secretary may create sub-
stantial administrative delay in an emergency situation requiring
immediate corrective action."9 This is particularly true because the
Secretary lacks the investigative powers possessed by the CAB to
monitor the situation and thereby make an accurate evaluation.' "
94 S. REP. No. 1718, supra note 37, at 8.
9 See R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 126-27 (1962).
International Competition Act, S 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
"' The Department of Transportation favors limiting the emergency cabotage
provisions to only those passengers holding confirmed reservations who are
stranded without means of transportation. Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79,
at 117.
9849 U.S.C.A. S 1421 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
9 Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 46.
"I Id. For example, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, an agency within
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Requiring the Board to confer with the Secretary before exercising
its exemption authority thus seems to impair the prompt issuance
of an exemption without any reciprocal benefit in terms of special
expertise from the Secretary."1" Fortunately, section 13 provides
that the Board need consult with the Secretary prior to the initial
thirty-day period only. ' Consequently, the Board may act uni-
laterally in granting exemption renewals."
Subsection 7(A) of section 13 requires that an "emergency"
exist to invoke the exemption.'" "Emergency" is not defined, but
the term is qualified by the requirement that it result from "unusual
circumstances not arising in the normal course of business.""'° A
Senate committee report indicates that this language prohibits the
Board from employing the exemption in markets where demand
occasionally exceeds supply during routine operations."' The re-
port explains that a shortage of seats on domestic carriers during
a peak season therefore does not constitute an emergency if the
incumbent carriers are operating in a normal manner."' The legis,
lative background further reveals that the 1979 United Airlines
strike, or grounding of the DC-10 aircraft, described as "severe
disruptions of the domestic and international air transportation
system,''. would be considered "emergencies" sufficient to war-
rant use of the exemption.0' A proposed amendment submitted by
the Air Transport Association to the Senate Subcommittee on
the CAB, may issue orders requiring air carriers to submit within a specified
period special reports, accounts, and documents whereby the CAB can deter-
mine the potential traffic in a market and the carriers' ability to accommodate it.
14 C.F.R. 5 385.22 (1979).
101 The CAB has also expressed its apprehension that the Secretary would be
"subject to the various political pressures of public office" which might inter-
fere with his ability to make a prompt determination. Hearings on S. 1300,
supra note 79, at 46.
10 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
103 Id.
104 Id. Earlier versions of section 13 required only that "unusual circumstances"
exist. S. REP. No. 329, supra note 53, at 9-10.
'1 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
01 S. REP. No. 329, supra note 53, at 10.
107 Id.




Aviation provided that an emergency exists only "as a result of a
sudden and critical reduction in capacity by one or more U.S. air
carriers which interrupts intestate [sic] commerce to a degree that
deprives any section of the United States... of essential air trans-
portation service. '" This language defines "emergency" very nar-
rowly and typifies the position of the air carriers and labor unions,
which uniformly sought to impose strict limitations upon the
Board's exemption authority."' Whether Congress intended such a
limited definition or whether less critical interruptions of air serv-
ice would also qualify as emergencies in this context is not clear."'
Instructive perhaps is Congress' failure to enumerate a specific list
of "emergencies," thereby granting the Board some latitude in
determining whether an emergency exists in a particular circum-
stance."3
Subsection 7 (B) of section 13 provides that "all possible efforts"
must have been made to accommodate the excess traffic on United
States carriers." This language is in contrast to an earlier draft
which required only that "all reasonable" efforts be made to re-
route traffic on domestic aircraft.' Subsection 7(B) thus contem-
plates that foreign carriers are to be granted cabotage privileges
only after domestic carrier resources have been totally exhausted.
A specific avenue which the CAB must pursue before granting the
"'Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 208.
" Id. at 191, 206, 217, 224. While the air carriers sought a very narrow
use of the emergency exemption, nevertheless they all conceded the validity of
the provision in order to protect the public from needless hardship when domestic
carriers are unavailable. Conversely, the Transport Workers Union, speaking
.on behalf of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, totally rejected any emergency
exemption proposal. Id. at 231, 236. The AFL-CIO contended that any carriage
of cabotage by foreign aircraft "would jeopardize the job security of U.S. airline
workers, would threaten the stability and security of the international air trans-
portation system, would further erode this nation's balance of payments position
and would introduce wasteful and unnecessary flight operations in major domestic
air transport markets." Id. at 231.
' Both the 1979 United Airlines strike and the DC-10 grounding would
certainly fit within this definition. The United Airlines strike resulted in the
grounding of twenty-four percent of the United States air fleet for eight weeks
while the DC-10 incident grounded fourteen percent of the domestic carriers for
five weeks. Id. at 40.
13International Competition Act, S 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in
49 U.S.C. § 1386).
14 Id.
115 S. 329, supra note 53, § 13.
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exemption includes the leasing of foreign aircraft, or sections of
foreign aircraft, by United States carriers, a procedure formerly
prohibited by section 1108(b) of the Federal Aviation Act'
since leasing effectively allowed foreign carriers to transport cabo-
tage traffic."'
Subsection 7(C) of section 13 allows the exemption authority
to be used only where "undue hardship" will result for the traffic
in the affected market."' Neither section 13, nor congressional
reports define "undue hardship." Under the plain meaning of the
term, a finding that the traffic will suffer a hardship only is in-
sufficient to invoke the exemption."' It must be an undue hardship,
one which is unnecessary or improper under the circumstances."
11049 U.S.C. § 1508(b) (1976).
17 The manner in which a leasing arrangement works under section 13 may
be illustrated by the following fact situation. During the DC-10 grounding,
Continental Airlines, which operated between American Samoa and Honolulu,
was unable to operate over the route because the rest of its fleet was not suited
for overseas transportation. Qantas Airways, which flew directly over American
Samoa on its route between Australia and Honolulu, had available space on
its carriers but was unable to accommodate any traffic because it had no cabotage
rights. Under section 13, Continental could enter into an agreement with Qantas
to lease the available space. Qantas could then carry cabotage traffic for Conti-
nental, and Continental would be responsible for the transportation of it. Hear-
ings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 247. Although it appears that leasing arrange-
ments such as the one outlined above would obviate the necessity for using the
section 13 exemption (since a United States carrier could simply lease all the
space it needs from foreign carriers), in reality this would not be the case.
First, in instances of a severe disruption, foreign carriers would be unable to
provide sufficient capacity for transportation (lift) to accommodate all the excess
traffic. Id. at 37. Second, even where foreign lift is available, it must be remem-
bered that a leasing agreement of this type is essentially a private contract between
two carriers in direct competition with each other. Telephone interview with
David Kirstein, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (February 3, 1980). If a United States carrier leases available capacity from
a foreign carrier, the foreign carrier is able to transport cabotage within the mean-
ing of section 1108 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976).
The result is an increase in the profitability of the foreign carrier's international
routes with little corresponding benefit to the domestic carrier. Telephone inter-
view with David Kirstein, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (February 3, 1980). It is thus apparent that United States
carriers lack incentive to make any such leasing arrangements and will gen-
erally resist entering into them. Id. Finally, leasing arrangements between foreign
and domestic carriers frequently will take too long to negotiate and will therefore
fail to provide prompt relief in an emergency. Id.
18 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. S 1386).
1Id.
1Id. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1697 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
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Although the phrase "undue hardship" is vague, it suggests that
the affected traffic must be threatened with a substantial burden
before the standard is satisfied. Logically, an undue: hardship would
apparently exist if shippers of perishable commodities were faced
with significant losses due to a shortage of domestic carriers.12
Conversely, the phrase connotes more than a mere passenger delay
or inconvenience due to a seasonal increase in traffic even though
substantial in character. Such fluctuations generally are not con-
sidered unreasonable burdens on traffic, but rather are recognized
as unavoidable disruptions which can be foreseen and which, thus,
allow travel and shipping arrangements to be made accordingly. 2
Hence, what constitutes an "undue hardship" may have reference
to the normal expectations and patterns of air traffic. This con-
struction appears reasonable when read in light of the language
in section 13 requiring, before an exemption may be granted,
that the emergency originate from "unusual circumstances not
arising in the normal course of business...1. By requiring that
traffic be threatened with an "undue hardship" before relief may
be afforded, subsection 7(C) appears to impose an unnecessarily
stringent requirement which over-protects the interests of domestic
carriers and labor groups without giving adequate weight to the
interests of the public generally.' If traffic unaccommodated by
domestic carriers is exposed to a hardship which is something
slightly less than "undue," the Board cannot grant an exemption,
and it becomes irrelevant under this standard that a substantial
public benefit might result if the exemption is employed." This
prohibition remains even though the air carriers will sustain no
perceptible injury if an exemption is authorized.'"
Subsection 7 (D) of section 13 provides that if adequate carrier
11 See S. REP. No. 329, supra note 53, at 10.
122 Id.
11 International Competition Act, 5 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. S 1386). Thus, the frequency and predictability of the transportation dis-
ruption, as well as the degree to which hardship can be foreseen and avoided,
may determine whether a hardship is an "undue hardship" within the statute's
meaning or only something less. Id.
124 See generally International Competition Act, S 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be
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service is not available in a market due to a labor dispute, an
exemption may not be granted when an "undue advantage to any
party to such dispute" will result."' It is submitted that the fore-
going provision is totally irreconcilable with the purpose of a
section 13 exemption (protection of the public)' and, if enforced
in accordance with these provisions, may render the section a
nullity when a labor dispute creates the emergency giving rise to
the exemption question.
Initially it is important to determine what constitutes an "undue
advantage.''. The congressional conference reports indicate only
that the term includes actions such as strike-breaking.'" A broad
reading of "undue advantage" in this context would include any
action which materially and improperly alters the relative negotia-
ting positions of labor and management.'"' Arguably, an undue
advantage may result in every instance in which foreign carriers
transport a significant portion of the traffic normally handled by
the striking labor group. Allowing foreign aircraft to provide
needed services during a strike reduces its hardship effect upon
the public, lessens public pressure upon the labor union or air-
line to settle the strike quickly and, consequently, allows the party
with the upper hand to adopt a "wait and see" attitude in its
negotiations. "
127 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386). The conference reports indicate that "any party" refers to
either labor or management. H. CONF. REP. No. 716, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1979); S. CONF. REP. No. 531, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
"I See notes 83-85 supra, and accompanying text.
129 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. 5 1386).
I-'H. CONF. REP. No. 716, supra note 127, at 20; S. CONF. REP. No. 531, supra
note 127, at 20.
I" See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1697 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
" See Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 198. In April of 1979, the
United Airlines strike threatened a major disruption of air travel in the Hawaii-
mainland market. The Bureau of Consumer Protection (Bureau), the agency
within the CAB charged with enforcement of the Federal Aviation Act, was in-
formed that United States carriers were unable to accommodate passengers
booked on United's flights between Hawaii and the west coast. Since traffic mov-
ing between Hawaii and the west coast constitutes cabotage within the meaning
of 1108(b), 49 U.S.C § 1508(b) (1976), the Bureau lacked the affirmative
authority to authorize foreign aircraft to transport the excess traffic. See notes
47, 53-59 supra, and accompanying text. However, the Bureau has broad dis-
cretion in enforcing the Federal Aviation Act. The Code of Federal Regulations
1080
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Regardless of whether or not an undue advantage will, in fact,
result in a particular situation, it is apparent that an undue ad-
vantage is more likely to result in the case of a massive crippling
strike than one which is of smaller dimensions. Recognizing that
the need for alternate carrier service increases with the magnitude
of the strike," use of the section 13 exemption during a massive,
nationwide strike will produce the greatest possible interference
in the ongoing labor dispute because foreign carriers will be trans-
porting traffic at a maximum volume level.1"' The more extensive
the strike, the greater is the resulting interference if the exemption
is granted and, therefore, greater is the likelihood of an undue
advantage accruing to labor or management. The less severe the
strike, the smaller will be its effect upon the air transportation
system. The subsequent need for foreign carriers to institute alter-
nate service will therefore be less, and the interference to the labor
dispute will be minimized. Consequently, the likelihood of an
undue advantage resulting to labor or management will be mini-
mal."n By way of illustration, consider the following hypotheticals.
provides that whenever the Bureau's Director reasonably believes that the statute
is being violated, and when it is in the public interest, the Director may institute
formal enforcement proceedings. 14 C.F.R. § 302.206 (1979). Acting under
this guideline, the Director of the Bureau, Reuben B. Robertson, announced
on April 3, 1979 the Bureau's finding that it would not be in the public interest
to commence enforcement proceedings against foreign carriers which accommo-
dated stranded airline passengers.
The Bureau's non-enforcement policy and the subsequent use of foreign car-
riers in domestic air transportation were termed as strike-breaking attempts by
the Air Line Pilots Association, the International Association of Machinists and
the Flight Engineers International Association. Av. DAILY, Apr. 13, 1979, at
253. Additionally, the Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, characterized
the Bureau's action as "government interference in a federally mediated strike.
* . ." Letter from Brock Adams to Marvin S. Cohen, Chairman of the CAB
(Apr. 9, 1979), reprinted in Av. DAILY, Apr. 23, 1979, at 300-01.
13 A strike of large dimensions has a greater paralyzing effect upon trans-
portation than a small, local one. Consequently, as more domestic planes are
grounded due to a strike the ability of other airlines to reroute the unaccommo-
dated traffic declines.
1 In the case of a severe, crippling strike, public and political pressure upon
labor unions and management to settle the dispute is great. See J. BAITSELL,
AIRLINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: PILOTS AND FLIGHT ENGINEERS 340 (1966).
See also Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 46. By providing an alternate
service, foreign carriers reduce public hardship and thus a significant pressure
upon the parties, particularly management, to conclude negotiations. See note
132 supra, and accompanying text.
" See notes 132-34 supra, and accompanying text.
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Assume the other requirements of section 13 are satisfied and
the only issue in granting the exemption is whether or not it will
create an undue advantage for either party in a labor dispute. The
mechanics of a major airline go on strike during a slack travel
season. As a result, the domestic carrier fleet is reduced to eighty
percent of its normal capacity. By increasing flights and maximiz-
ing freight capacity, United States carriers are able to accommo-
date ninety-nine percent of the striking airline's traffic. In this
hypothetical, the CAB may readily conclude no undue advantage
will result for labor or management if foreign carriers are permitted
to carry the unaccommodated traffic. Any undue advantage which
may occur is primarily caused by the United States carriers which
have rerouted all but one percent of the traffic to their flights. The
effect of an exemption is negligible in this instance, and an exemp-
tion may properly be granted in accordance with section 7 (D). '
Conversely, consider the following fact situation. The pilots of
two major airlines go on strike during a peak holiday travel season.
The domestic carrier fleet is reduced to sixty-five percent of its
normal capacity. United States carriers are able to accommodate
only eighty percent of the striking airlines' traffic. In this hypo-
thetical, foreign carriers can feasibly carry up to twenty percent
of the airlines' traffic. Granting an exemption in this case could
have enormous effects upon the parties' relative bargaining posi-
tions.13 This fact situation would therefore be most likely to re-
sult in an undue advantage to either labor or management and an
exemption should not be granted. '
Subsection 7 (D) thus appears to decrease use of the exemption
authority as a strike increases in dimension and its effect becomes
more severe. 3' This result, however, is completely illogical from
the perspective of the public interest. It is obvious that the more
massive a strike becomes and the more crippling its effect upon
air transportation, the more appropriate is the occasion for grant-
ing an exemption in order to alleviate the hardship upon the public.
aSee generally International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1386).
1317See notes 132-34 supra, and accompanying text.
"'See generally International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1386).
1 See notes 132-38 supra, and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the legislative background of section 13 indicates it
is specifically intended to apply during a severe labor dispute, such
as the 1979 United Airlines strike.'
The purpose of subsection 7(D), protection of the airlines and
labor organizations in a dispute, " ' seems to be in direct conflict
with the purpose of a section 13 exemption, protection of the
public from severe disruption in air transportation.'" If the Board
finds that an undue advantage will result when it grants an exemp-
tion during severely disruptive strikes, it will be nullifying its own
authority in a case in which that authority is most needed to protect
the public from harm. Significantly, the CAB has argued previously
that use of foreign carriers to provide alternate service during a
strike leaves the labor dispute unaffected.'" According to the CAB,
allowing foreign carriers to provide substitute services in these
circumstances is "essentially a labor neutral question" which
merely serves the public and leaves the parties' status quo un-
altered.'" This logic suggests that the CAB will interpret "undue
advantage" under section 13 to mean something more than a mere
removal of public pressure. If so, the CAB's position ' will dis-
courage a finding of "undue advantage" in this context. This view,
however, appears to nullify to a great extent the legislative intent
behind subsection 7(D). Whether the CAB's argument will be
accepted in a particular case by the Secretary of Transportation
or a reviewing court remains to be seen. Regardless, the basic con-
flict between section 13 and subsection 7(D) remains. If a finding
of "undue advantage" under subsection 7(D) is made, that de-
termination will render section 13 inapplicable, irrespective of the
resulting hardship to the general public."
140 S. REP. No. 329, supra note 53, at 9-10.
41 International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
' 2See notes 83-85 supra, and accompanying text.
'"Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 51. The CAB made this statement
in response to charges by the AFL-CIO that its non-enforcement policy during
the United Airlines strike constituted strike-breaking. See note 132 supra.
'"Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 51.
145 Id.
'See generally International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1386).
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CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis illustrates the strong protectionism em-
bodied in section 13. Its multiple restrictions evidence a legislative
intent to provide maximum protections for the airline industry and
labor interests. Subsection 7(A) excludes foreign carriers from
domestic air transportation so long as domestic carriers are operat-
ing in a routine manner.' Subsection 7(B) of section 13 assures
maximum utilization of United States carriers, giving them priority
over foreign carriers'."' Subsection 7(C) limits the exemption's
use so as to apply only in cases of real hardship to the public.
Absent such a necessity, the exemption cannot be granted, even
though there is no evidence that American carriers and labor will
be harmed.'49 Subsection 7 (D) protects the aviation industry, labor,
and management in strike situations which may be affected by an
influx of foreign carrier competition." These and other checks im-
posed by section 13, including coextensive findings by dual govern-
ment agencies' and prompt cessation of the exemption authority
once the emergency conditions terminate,' represent a continua-
tion of the protectionist attitude which traditionally has character-
ized the United States' position on cabotage.lu Consequently, the
limited scope of section 13 provides only a minimal concession
to the public's interest in the domestic air transportation system
while leaving almost wholly intact the cabotage prohibitions of
the Federal Aviation Act.
The critical flaw of section 13 is this unduly excessive weight
accorded domestic carrier and labor interests. Today, the United
States aviation industry is sufficiently strong commercially that
foreign competition need not be so restricted in order to guarantee
the continued viability of domestic carriers."' In addition, the
purpose of the cabotage prohibition, to protect American airlines,
'
47 See notes 104-09 supra, and accompanying text.
'4'See notes 114-17 supra, and accompanying text.
'4' See notes 118-26 supra, and accompanying text.
"
0 See note 127 supra, and accompanying text.
121 See note 96 supra, and accompanying text.
's' International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1386).
, See notes 8, 15, 20-24, 44, 53 supra, and accompanying text.
"S As one congressman has noted: "Historically, aviation was a fledgling
industry which needed help and financial guarantees, and the public needed con-
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workers, and markets from foreign competition, is largely irrelevant
in situations where the traffic cannot otherwise be accommodated
by United States airlines. Where domestic carriers are unavailable,
foreign carriers and crews are not displacing domestic ones, but
merely serving an important public need for transportation. Also,
to the extent that foreign carriers will increase domestic trans-
portation during an emergency, American employment is in-
creased, not decreased, due to the additional ground handling serv-
ices, booking services, and related activities which are associated
with airline travel.1 ' With regard to labor disputes, it is contended
that one of the parties will be more willing to frustrate negotia-
tions due to the decrease in public pressure to settle.1 Even where
public pressure is brought to bear, however, there is no guarantee
that negotiations will be concluded swiftly, as demonstrated by
the 1979 United Airlines strike which grounded twenty-four per-
cent of the domestic carrier fleet but, nevertheless, lasted eight
weeks.""7 Additionally, any potential effect which foreign carrier
service may have upon strike negotiations is limited by the amount
of substitute service provided by non-striking domestic carriers."'
Even recognizing that labor and airline interests may be ad-
versely affected in a particular instance by an exemption, there is
a vital public interest involved here which must receive fair con-
sideration. Where the negative impact upon negotiating parties is
insubstantial in relation to the overall benefit which the public may
realize if an exemption is granted, the Board should have authority
to award an exemption. This is particularly true when alter-
nate transportation modes are not available. Previously, a finding
under subsection 7(D) that an undue advantage will result for
trols for safety. But we are 40 years from that point and there is no need for
the CAB to be overly protective of a $100 billion industry." Cohen, Regulatory
Report/CAB's New Chairman Charts an Independent Course, 7 NAT'L J. REP.
1559, 1566 (1975) (quoting Rep. Norman Y. Mineta).
'5 Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 93.
... See note 132 supra, and accompanying text.
15I Hearings on S. 1300, supra note 79, at 40.
158 In response to allegations that the Bureau's non-enforcement policy dur-
ing the United Airlines strike constituted strike-breaking and interference, see
note 132 supra, Marvin Cohen, Chairman of the CAB, responded that he per-
ceived "no difference in whether U.S. or foreign air carriers provided such substi-
tute service during a work stoppage." Letter from Marvin S. Cohen to Brock
Adams, Secretary of Transportation (Apr. 27, 1979), reprinted in Av. DAILY,
May 1, 1979, at 5-6.
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either party is an absolute bar to granting an exemption, without
further consideration of other public benefits which an exemption
might produce."' A similar criticism applies to subsection 7 (C). '
By requiring that traffic face undue hardship before an exemption
may be granted, subsection 7(C) incorrectly focuses upon con-
siderations of public harm and ignores the potential benefit to
the public. In addition, 7(C) provides no mechanism whereby
the Board can consider the actual impact which a section 13
exemption may have upon the domestic carriers and work force.""1
Subsection 7(C), therefore, may bar an exemption even though
there is no injury to those interests.'
A better approach, one which adequately protects the interests
of the general public, labor groups, and the airline industry, is to
delete subsections 7(C) and 7(D) altogether, relying instead
upon an analysis which gives appropriate consideration to all in-
terests concerned. The inquiry would then focus upon all the fac-
tors relevant to granting an exemption, allowing the Board to
adopt a balancing approach in order to accord proper weight to
each, with no one factor controlling. If, after weighing all the
factors, the Board determines that an exemption would result in a
substantial net benefit, the exemption would be granted. Considera-
tions which would be relevant to this analysis include, among
others:
1. The potential benefit to the general public, shippers, con-
signees and businesses if the exemption is granted.
2. The potential hardship to the general public, shippers, con-
signees and businesses if the exemption is denied.
3. The potential benefit to United States air carriers if the ex-
emption is denied.
4. The potential hardship to United States air carriers if the
exemption is granted.
5. The potential duration of the emergency.
6. The segment of the transportation market affected.
See generally International Competition Act, § 13, 94 Stat. 39-40 (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1386).





7. The availability of essential air transportation.
8. The availability of alternate modes of transportation.
9. The impact upon parties to a labor dispute.
In evaluating these factors, the Board would necessarily consider
long-range as well as immediate effects. The future financial via-
bility of domestic carriers, the promotion of equitable working
conditions in the aviation industry, and the improved competitive
position of foreign carriers would all be long-term considerations
which the Board would incorporate into its decision-making
process. Of course, a section 13 determination would still require
the Board to make the specific findings of subsections 7(A) and
7(B)." This would assure the existence of emergency circum-
stances and the complete expenditure of domestic carrier resources
before the exemption authority could be exercised.1'
Frequently, the determination to grant or deny an exemption
would be the same under section 13 as it would be under the an-
alysis suggested above. If a small segment of the national trans-
portation market is affected by a strike, and a substantial nega-
tive impact would result to the bargaining leverage of the labor
group if an exemption is authorized, the result would generally
be a denial of the exemption under the suggested balancing ap-
proach. In that case, the immediate public benefit would probably
be outweighed by the employee benefits lost if union negotiations
proved unsuccessful." ' The result would be the same under sec-
tion 13 since it disallows an exemption grant where an undue
advantage may result for either party to a labor dispute. Con-
versely, if the affected market depends almost exclusively upon
air transportation (Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam), then an
exemption might be appropriate under the balancing approach,
despite the prejudicial impact which an exemption would have
upon negotiating parties. The vital public need for essential air
transportation therefore would be the paramount consideration
16 See notes 104-17 supra, and accompanying text.
I" d.
1 The findings which the CAB must make when balancing these interests
would impose no greater burden upon the Board than presently exists under the
section 13 requirement that the CAB determine whether an "undue advantage"
will result for either party to a labor dispute. See note 71 supra, and accompany-
ing text.
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under those circumstances. The weight which the Board would
actually assign to this factor, or to any individual consideration,
depends on all the relevant circumstances. Hence, though a market
is deprived of essential air transportation, the Board may decline
to grant an exemption if the substitute service would alter the
relative bargaining positions of labor and management and thereby
prolong a strike which otherwise would be concluded rapidly.
The suggested modification of section 13 gives equitable con-
sideration to all interests concerned. The required findings of 7 (A)
and 7(B) exclude foreign carriers from domestic air transporta-
tion where the need is not genuine. By eliminating subsection 7 (C)
and 7(D), the suggested formula abandons these artificial re-
strictions in favor of a balancing approach which better accom-
modates the public's needs in relation to the air transportation
system.
The United States traditionally has reserved cabotage for do-
mestic carriers, thereby granting them a monopoly in domestic air
transportation. By excluding foreign carrier competition, United
States cabotage law gave ample protection to the interests of
American carriers and labor but failed to consider the public's
need for air transportation when domestic carriers were unavail-
able. Section 13 of the International Competition Act attempts to
remedy this result by providing the CAB authority, in narrow
circumstances, to exempt foreign carriers from the cabotage pro-
hibitions of the Federal Aviation Act. In many respects, however,
section 13 fails to protect adequately the public interest to be
served. The statutory restrictions impose excessive limitations upon
the scope of section 13. The worst example is the provision that
an exemption may not be issued when an undue advantage will
result for either party to a labor dispute.
This narrow application of section 13 is open to criticism. No
longer is aviation a fledgling industry which must be protected
without due regard for the public, nor is labor threatened in this
context with such hardship that its concerns should dominate
those of the public. A better approach would balance fairly all
relevant concerns without undue restriction on the Board's author-
ity to arrange alternate air service to meet the public's need for
domestic air transportation.
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